

# **FM 34-8-2**

## **INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S HANDBOOK**

**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

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FM 34-8-2  
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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Table of Contents

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	Page
PREFACE .....	iv
CHAPTER 1 - G2/S2 ROLES AND MISSIONS .....	1-1
Why You Need This Handbook .....	1-1
Purpose of This Handbook .....	1-1
CHAPTER 2 - FORCE PROJECTION .....	2-1
Force Projection Principles .....	2-1
Intelligence Readiness .....	2-2
Indications and Warnings .....	2-5
Stages of Force Projection Operations .....	2-6
CHAPTER 3 - MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (MDMP) .....	3-1
CHAPTER 4 - S2 OPERATIONS CHECKLISTS .....	4-1
APPENDIX A. UNIT INTELLIGENCE TRAINING CHECKLIST .....	A-1
APPENDIX B. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD PRODUCTS .....	B-1
APPENDIX C. RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLANNING .....	C-1
APPENDIX D. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS, AND INDICATORS .....	D-1
APPENDIX E. GRAPHIC REPORT FORMATS .....	E-1
APPENDIX F. TARGETING .....	F-1
APPENDIX G. IEW SYSTEMS .....	G-0
APPENDIX H. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNITS AND CAPABILITIES .....	H-1
APPENDIX I. INTELLIGENCE TRANSITION CHECKLIST .....	I-1
APPENDIX J. INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE LIST .....	J-1
APPENDIX K. WEATHER ELEMENTS AND SUPPORT .....	K-1
GLOSSARY .....	Glossary-1
REFERENCES .....	References-1

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## LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

	Page
Table 1-1.	Collection resources . . . . . 2-1
Table 4-1.	Mission checklist . . . . . 4-2
Table 4-2.	N-Hour critical times . . . . . 4-4
Table 4-3.	N-Hour critical actions list. . . . . 4-5
Table 4-4.	Mission planning sequence. . . . . 4-6
Table C-1.	G2/S2 R&S responsibilities . . . . . C-1
Table F-1.	Bulk electric power supply . . . . . F-38
Table K-1.	Weather effects from cloud ceilings . . . . . K-13
Table K-2.	Weather effects from reduced visibility . . . . . K-14
Table K-3.	Weather effects from precipitation . . . . . K-17
Table K-4.	Weather and environmental data elements impacting Army systems and operations . . . . . K-19
Table K-5.	Windchill chart . . . . . K-21
Table K-6.	Daily water consumption requirements for three levels of activity . . . . . K-23
Table K-7.	Work time in hot weather operations . . . . . K-24
Table K-8.	WBGT index (light work) . . . . . K-24
Table K-9.	Conversion factors . . . . . K-25
Figure 2-1.	Principles of force projection IEW operations . . . . . 2-2
Figure B-1.	Modified combined obstacles overlay . . . . . B-2
Figure B-2.	Population status overlay . . . . . B-2
Figure B-3.	Key facilities and target overlay . . . . . B-3
Figure B-4.	Logistics sustainability overlay . . . . . B-4
Figure B-5.	Concealment and cover overlay . . . . . B-5
Figure B-6.	Lines of communication overlay . . . . . B-6
Figure B-7.	Doctrinal template - depicts enemy forces according to doctrinal deployment, unconstrained by terrain . . . . . B-7
Figure B-8.	Situation template - depicts deployed enemy forces adjusted for obstacles and terrain . . . . . B-7
Figure B-9.	Decision support template . . . . . B-8
Figure B-10.	Partial BOS synchronization matrix . . . . . B-9
Figure B-11.	Event template - considers COAs of reinforcing or counterattacking forces . . . . . B-9
Figure B-12.	Event template - depicts key events in each threat COA . . . . . B-10
Figure B-13.	Event matrix . . . . . B-11
Figure B-14.	Sample of an ADA-tailored IPB . . . . . B-12
Figure C-1.	R&S planning process . . . . . C-2

	Page	
Figure C-2.	R&S planning considerations . . . . .	C-6
Figure C-3.	Example of a brigade reconnaissance OPORD . . . . .	C-8
Figure C-4.	R&S overlay with instructions on acetate . . . . .	C-12
Figure C-5.	R&S tasking matrix . . . . .	C-15
Figure C-6.	Example of a GSR OPORD . . . . .	C-17
Figure C-7.	Sample IREMBASS employment OPORD . . . . .	C-19
Figure C-8.	Sample patrol employment OPORD . . . . .	C-20
Figure C-9.	Sample debrief format . . . . .	C-21
Figure E-1.	Graphic INTSUM . . . . .	E-3
Figure E-2.	Threat unit locations and mission activities (committed) . . . . .	E-4
Figure E-3.	Threat unit locations and mission activities (uncommitted) . . . . .	E-5
Figure E-4.	Threat mission capabilities assessment . . . . .	E-6
Figure E-5.	Threat problem area symbology . . . . .	E-7
Figure E-6.	Threat air activity symbology . . . . .	E-8
Figure E-7.	Predicted threat activity timelines . . . . .	E-9
Figure F-1.	Functions of intelligence support to targeting . . . . .	F-2
Figure F-2.	Targeting methodology. . . . .	F-3
Figure F-3.	Targeting checklist . . . . .	F-3
Figure F-4.	The targeting process . . . . .	F-7
Figure F-5.	Example high-payoff target list . . . . .	F-9
Figure F-6.	Example target selection standards matrix . . . . .	F-10
Figure F-7.	Example attack guidance matrix . . . . .	F-13
Figure F-8.	BOS detection capabilities . . . . .	F-17
Figure F-9.	Intelligence disciplines . . . . .	F-19
Figure F-10.	Deliver functions and responsibilities . . . . .	F-22
Figure F-11.	BDA functions . . . . .	F-27
Figure F-12.	CARVER techniques . . . . .	F-31
Figure H-1.	MI battalion (heavy division) . . . . .	H-1
Figure H-2.	MI Battalion (Light, Airborne, Air Assault Division) . . . . .	H-2
Figure H-3.	Corps MI Brigade . . . . .	H-3
Figure H-4.	Organization, MI Detachment, Spt Co, SFG . . . . .	H-4
Figure H-5.	Organization, MI Detachment, Spt Co, SFB . . . . .	H-4
Figure K-1.	Common weather elements . . . . .	K-2
Figure K-2.	IPB weather overlay criteria . . . . .	K-4
Figure K-3.	Example of a weather forecast chart . . . . .	K-9
Figure K-4.	Example of a weather impacts display chart . . . . .	K-10
Figure K-5.	Critical weather factors . . . . .	K-11

## PREFACE

This publication is a roles and missions manual for G2/S2 sections. As the companion handbook to FM 34-8, this manual is written for officers serving as the G2 or S2 in combat, CS, and CSS units. It provides guidance for officers and NCOs assigned to G2/S2 sections. G2s should find this handbook a useful MTP when executing intelligence training responsibilities.

The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, AZ. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-D, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

This manual does not implement any ISAs. However, it complies with the following STANAGs:

- STANAG 2022, Intelligence Reports, Edition 8.
- STANAG 2077, Order of Battle, Edition 5.
- STANAG 2149, Intelligence Requests, Edition 5.
- STANAG 2844, Counterintelligence Procedures, Edition 2.
- STANAG 2936, Intelligence Doctrine, Edition 2.
- STANAG 6010, Electronic Warfare in the Land Battle, Edition 1.

It also complies with QSTAG 593, Mutual Support Between EW Units; and QSTAG 1034, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

Unless specifically designated, all references to the intelligence officer at corps, division, brigade, or battalion will be stated as S2.

Acronyms and brevity codes used in this manual are identified only in the glossary.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Chapter 1

G2/S2 ROLES AND MISSIONS

WHY YOU NEED THIS HANDBOOK

The G2/S2 must provide continuous intelligence and information for the commander to conduct operations and minimize risk.

Intelligence is the commander's decisionmaking tool. The commander, who drives intelligence, does so for planning before deployment, while enroute, and during operations and redeployment. The S2/NCO—

- Provides the commander timely and accurate intelligence, IPB, I&W, and vulnerability assessments for force protection, targeting, and BDA.
- Makes decisive predictions on when and where an action will take place.
- Prioritizes IR.
- Integrates with other staff elements on I&S issues.
- Provides the commander with a view of all facets of the battlefield.
- Ensures his staff is trained.

PURPOSE OF THIS HANDBOOK

This manual does not replace the doctrine and TTP contained in the other FM 34-series manuals; it does, however, focus on their application. It also summarizes information that helps the S2 manage and coordinate the CCIR. It provides the S2 the roles and missions required for executing the intelligence support function.

The G2/S2 is the "Top Down"/"Bottom Up" integrator of RISTA operations, which have always been performed at the brigade and battalion levels. Three factors help to redefine traditional R&S planning:

- Top Down reporting.
- Bottom Up reporting.
- Digitization.

Systems and technologies available to units make an integrated approach to managing "top down" and "bottom up" reporting feasible. The ACT serves as the nexus of RISTA operations, digitally linking the brigade S2 with the automated capabilities of the DS MI company, resulting in RISTA operations which blend intelligence, R&S, and TA. (See FM 101-5 for G2/S2 responsibilities and Table 1-1 for RISTA collection resources.)

Table 1-1. Collection resources

IEW	RISTA
SIGINT	Troops in contact
IMINT	Other troops in contact (RAS)
HUMINT	Scouts (aerial & ground)
CI	LRS, SOF
MASINT	Countermortar & CB radars
TECHINT	Gun cameras
	Hand emplaced sensors
	CA, PAO, PSYOP

## Chapter 2

# FORCE PROJECTION

### FORCE PROJECTION PRINCIPLES

Future Army operations will rely more heavily on the force projection of US combat power. There is no single method to support force projection. This chapter identifies key principles and considerations for planning and executing IEW force projection.

Successful force projection of IEW support is based on understanding and applying the key principles shown in Figure 2-1.


Other key force projection components are intelligence readiness and a requirement to define responsibilities each echelon performs down to the lowest tactical level. This chapter discusses—

- Intelligence readiness.
- I&W.
- Stages of force projection operations (minus operations).

Considerations are in a logical order but may not be sequential nor applicable for all force projection missions. Corps and division G2s must provide primary planning support for force projection operations because of their expertise. The S2 at each level identifies—

- Personal knowledge deficiencies (e.g., communications architecture, imagery dissemination systems and methods, ability to identify the staff's shortcomings).





**Figure 2-1. Principles of force projection IEW operations.**

- Technical limitations (e.g., ASAS, SIDS capability).
- Intelligence gaps with adequate specifics.

## INTELLIGENCE READINESS

In a JTF force projection operation, higher echelons will provide intelligence for situation and target development to lower echelons (top down) until the tactical ground force completes entry and secures the lodgment area. The JTF J2 may be reluctant to push everything down through tactical intelligence channels due to the volume of the intelligence information available. The S2 may receive support on a “smart push” basis, and needs to know his requirements to be able to do a “smart pull.”

The most significant change in the evolution of force projection operations is the enhanced information flow through hierarchical and non-hierarchical networks (computer, communications, and personal). The S2 should—

- Review available databases on assigned contingency AIs; conduct IPB on these AIs; and develop appropriate IPB products.
- Be aware of higher HQ SOPs and DIA manuals for specific CM guidance.
- Prepare, practice, and conduct information collection activities as part of in-garrison IO rehearsals.

- Preplan and practice an intelligence "surge" on likely contingency crises.
- Prepare and practice coordination from predeployment through redeployment with personnel from imagery, SIGINT, HUMINT, SWO, CA, PSYOP, and SF units, to include databases and connectivity.
- Ensure the following are a part of the daily operating environment:
  - RC and other augmentation.
  - Line numbers and SOPs including a linguist plan with proficiency scores (alert through early entry phases of deployment).
  - Training (individual and collective).
- Form ad hoc intelligence links and networks early on to meet a developing contingency. Incorporate, request, and receive intelligence from unfamiliar sources (linguists, MI augmentation, other services); exploit NGOs and PVOs once a crisis emerges. Exchange communications protocols with theater and higher HQ and subordinate and lateral units.
- Forward all RILs to the higher HQ IAW SOPs. The J2, G2, and S2 can focus intelligence downward based on the commander's needs.
- Understand the JTF J2's multiple echelon and broadcast dissemination capability to ensure NRT reporting to all deployed, in transit, or preparing to deploy forces.
- Maintain an intelligence database on the battlefield environment and threats for each contingency. The S2 must state and record the CCIR as PIR, subordinate SOR, and SIR, and include the following:
  - For the battlefield environment, the commander's approval of the AI, to include separate ground, air, littoral waters, and political AIs.
  - Maps, terrain, and weather products. Request from National Imagery and Mapping Agency hard copies (unclassified or at the lowest classification). Request authority to declassify these products locally.

- Digitized products (map sheets for ASAS, terrain data, and imagery).
- Physical environmental information. The TERRA BASE program allows S2s to template the effects of terrain on communications and direct fire. During mission analysis, TERRA BASE or other automated terrain products—WINCATS, TOPOSKINNER—provide the S2 a tool to help the commander visualize how terrain can affect friendly and enemy forces. These products can illuminate terrain effects for subordinate commanders in the OPORD brief. [Technique: Use the program at Home Station to develop and sustain proficiency.] The supporting engineer staff officer may also have terrain visualization products.
- Threat or potential threats. The intelligence community, primarily the NGIC, and open sources produce products useful for intelligence readiness. These products can be tailored to best support the commander. (See FM 34-3 for information on intelligence analysis.) INTELLINK will be an S2's primary access to any type of requested strategic intelligence. Examples of strategic level products include—
  - Global security forecast.
  - Battlefield development plans.
  - Automated and hardcopy databases.
  - Arms proliferation and military power studies related to the weapons acquisition strategies and the overall military power and potential of selected foreign military forces.
  - TECHINT and User Bulletins.
  - CIA World Fact Book and DIA country studies.
  - Open source studies and articles.
  - Other services.

INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS
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Theater and national intelligence units monitor regional and global threats to

provide I&W intelligence to the NCA and military commanders. I&W intelligence flows to strategic, operational, and tactical commanders; it prevents surprise, reduces risk, and supports development and refinement of CONPLANS. The S2 must ensure the commander identifies PIR, IR, and targeting requirements for each assigned contingency area. The S2 should—

- Conduct CM and synchronization planning on I&W requirements. Review your unit's collection plan and preplanned SOR for each contingency area. If necessary, refine existing collection plans and SOR.
- Review and modify reporting procedures for I&W contingency areas. This may involve changing intelligence reporting (e.g., increasing reporting on one area and decreasing reporting on another) and message routing addresses and precedence (e.g., FLASH designation).
- Prioritize and forward SOR to higher headquarters.
- Disseminate intelligence and information to the commander, staff, and subordinate units.
- Coordinate for direct dissemination when possible.
- Recommend to the commander whether to maintain or increase unit readiness levels; plan and surge the intelligence effort for the impending operation; or move the unit from its current mission to contingency, branch, or subsequent operations.
- Adjust intelligence readiness steps according to pre-crisis I&W.

## STAGES OF FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS

REMINDER: All phases of the intelligence cycle are being executed continuously during all stages of force projection.

### MOBILIZATION:

Mobilization is a process in which the armed forces augment the AC capability in preparation for war or other national emergencies. It includes activating all or part of the RC assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel; and certifying the proficiency of individuals and units.

## FM 34-8-2

(See FM 100-17 for mobilization process.) In peacetime, AC and RC MI units plan, train, and prepare together to accomplish mobilization and deployment tasks. During the mobilization phase, the S2 should—

- Assist the mobilizing RC unit by preparing and conducting intelligence training and threat update briefings and by disseminating intelligence.
- Identify force requirements for the different types of operations and CONPLANS.
- Employ and adhere to existing procedures.
- If possible, use prior coordinated IMAs to fill gaps created by personnel shortages. These IMAs should already have a working knowledge of your SOPs and understand the mission.
- Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W indicators.
- Conduct or coordinate CI and OPSEC training and operations.
- Manage IR and RII from your unit and subordinate units.
- Evaluate reporting.
- Update collection planning.

### PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY:

Predeployment activity provides the foundation for subsequent force projection operations.

- I&W will continue throughout force projection operations. The S2 must perform IPB early and continuously. (See FM 33-1, FM 34-130, FM 41-10.)
- Accelerated training will ensure all AC and RC MI units are able to conduct IEW operations. Integrate mobilization and deployment tasks into unit METL and training; emphasize and integrate critical aspects of force projection into battle tasks and planning.
- Focus broadbased knowledge to support CONPLAN refinement (IPB).

- Ensure tactical tailoring or split-based operation planning is based on an existing CONPLAN.
- Establish appropriate relationships; establish higher, lower, and lateral liaisons if they are different.
- Continuously conduct and update CM and IEW synchronization planning.
  - IO synchronization ensures IO are linked to the CCIR and respond in time to influence decisions and operations. IO encompasses more than just MI assets and requires MI support. (See FM 34-40 and FM 100-6.)
- IEW synchronization ensures IEW operations are linked to the CCIR and respond in time to influence decisions and operations. IEW is a subset of IO.
- The commander generates CCIR. CCIR focus on what is critical. They should change as the situation changes. CCIR affect PIR, IR, EEFI, and FFIR.
  - Plan imagery coverage for target nomination, validation, and PSA.
  - Require from collection assets, timelines for preplanned and dynamic collection requests.
  - Plan synchronization through all five steps of the intelligence cycle.
  - Ensure each PIR is related to a specific operational decision. (See FM 34-2 and FM 100-6.)
  - Prepare an ISM and backward plan so collection production efforts are executed with the operation; deliver focused intelligence to support operational decisions.
  - Coordinate with the S3 and signal officer for EW offensive and electronic deception operations, specifically for target nomination, no-fire target criteria, protected frequencies, and synchronized EW effort during all phases of the operation.
  - Plan BDA requirements.
  - Refine, manage, and update SOR. Monitor and maintain synchronization.

## FM 34-8-2

- Anticipate and initiate collection early against long lead-time requirements.
- Ensure CCIR process is continuous and the intelligence cycle and IEW operations remain tied to the commander's decisions and concept of operations.
- Identify collection gaps after you synthesize available information on the AO and coordinate the collection efforts of existing intelligence organizations. (Consider national, EAC, other US forces and services, and HN support.)
- Develop a collection strategy which factors PIR, IR, and METT-TC. Submit RII and other requests for support to adjacent, higher, and HN units. Develop a collection plan which supports all PIR and IR and maintains synchronization.
- Develop your intelligence team:
  - *Commander's intelligence support*: The S2 and supporting MI commander form the maneuver commander's intelligence team. ASAS is the primary intelligence processing system supporting this team. A unit may need to augment its S2 staff, to include area experts, TECHINT LNOs, linguists, interrogators, intelligence analysts, and CI agents. Tailor the size and sophistication of the deploying unit's intelligence staff to the mission.
  - *ACT*: The DS MI company provides an ACT to support the commander's intelligence team at brigade.
    - *Additional attachments*: These could include PSYOP and CA.
    - *DISE*: This is a small intelligence support team that provides communications, automated intelligence fusion, and broadcast downlinks in a small package capable of deploying with Army early entry forces.
      - Decide whether you will form the DISE from the organic assets of the early entry force or from the corps ACE, supporting EAC MI brigade, or a combination thereof.
      - Plan the configuration, which can range from "briefcases" (Mini-DISE) to HMMWVs (DISE vehicular), and are normally staffed by 5 to 12 soldiers, respectively. Build the supporting hardware systems around the Army's ASAS and integrate them with other Army, joint intelligence, and communication capabilities.

- Plan whether the DISE will expand to a full ACE as lodgment operations are completed or will disband once the mission is accomplished.
- Plan situations in which the DISE will go directly to higher headquarters for information without the home base's approval.
- Plan on requirements to support the DISE with 24-hour operations.
- *ISB*: This is the rear element of split-based operations that provides processed and analyzed intelligence to the DISE.
  - Plan the automation, communications capacity, and personnel necessary to provide continuous intelligence requirements management, collection, processing, and reporting.
  - Plan all procedures for the DISE to "pull" specific intelligence products and reports, obtain status of collection, and "push" the current intelligence picture from the lodgment back to the ARFOR and JTF commanders if not in theater.
- Plan all links to higher intelligence organizations, including the JIC and the elements designed to leverage theater intelligence; focus on support down to the corps and echelons below corps (e.g., the CMISE).
- Coordinate with and understand the capabilities of the JTF to include the NIST if formed.
- Plan to use RC augmentation. Some examples are a mix of CI agents, UAVs, interrogators, and linguists.
  - Transportation availability (aircraft or naval vessel) for deployment.
  - Sustainability.
  - Portability once deployed.
  - Disciplined operations. The commander's ability to collect may be affected by nonmilitary decisionmakers. The CINC can contribute to the deploying commander by ensuring at the outset that intelligence is decompartmented and releasable to allied units (if



applicable).

- Review applicable publications (ARs, DA Pamphlets, USSIDs).
- Review SOFAs, ROE, international laws, and other agreements. (Coordinate with SJA on these issues.)
- Review applicable NIMA guidance.
- Establish force deployment priorities based upon METT-T. Sequence initial required forces and capabilities, build-up priorities, and follow-on forces to ensure a sequenced plan, a tailored force, and established command and support relationships. Consider sensors, processors, preprocessors, CI, and HUMINT. Maintain unit integrity.
- Plan communications architecture (build redundancy when possible). Remember to—
  - Plan links to the JTF DISE, if formed, that complements the NIST. (See FM 34-25-3 and FM 34-37).
  - Ensure intelligence links provide the early entry commander vital access to multisource Army and joint intelligence collection assets, processing systems, and databases.
- Ensure collection is synchronized with production, and intelligence is still synchronized with operations (specify reporting procedures and timelines).
- Finalize the IEW OPLAN (terrain and communications deconfliction). Coordinate with the MI commander on his tactical decisionmaking process. Understand the MI commander's SOR that are his specified tasks, implied tasks, task organization, concept of operation (the organization, deployment, allocation, and employment of subordinate MI units), and coordination requirements with forward maneuver units.
- Establish the intelligence crossover point. Estimate the time and establish a measurable criteria to indicate when you have reached that point. Intelligence crossover occurs when enough tactical collection assets are in theater to reduce the dependency upon strategic

or national assets. (See FM 34-1, Chapter 3.)

- Receive all augmentation and support elements quickly (ACT, DISE) and incorporate them within your unit, SOP, and training.
- Update databases to support the IPB process that will follow. Practice using INTELLINK.
- Support force protection. Intelligence operations—MDCI in particular—identify, locate, and target an enemy's ability to target and affect friendly forces, facilities, and operations. Intelligence support must—
  - Conduct threat and risk assessment.
  - Consider elements of fratricide avoidance:
    - Accurate target identification.
    - Collateral weapon effects.
    - Familiarity with supporting units.
    - ROE.
  - Consider elements of force protection:
    - Information Warfare:
      - \* OPSEC.
      - \* Physical destruction.
      - \* PSYOP.
      - \* Deception.
      - \* EW.
    - COMSEC.
    - NBC.

- Personnel security.
  - Neutrality maintenance.
  - Personal awareness.
  - Sniper threat.
  - Counterreconnaissance.
  - Arms and physical security.
- Using the MDCI process, assess and review friendly vulnerabilities and the threat's ability to exploit them.
- S2s should inform commanders and operators on CI and MDCI analysis.
  - Train your MDCI analysts to conduct reverse IPB and think like the enemy S2, to include the enemy's perception of friendly centers of gravity and how he will attack or influence them.
  - Incorporate your MDCI analysis into the G2/J2 situation and decision briefings and all planning (especially deception planning).
  - Assign CI and MDCI sections appropriate missions and analytical responsibilities, such as rear area threat analysis, and continuously assess effectiveness.
- Identify potential countermeasures to deny the enemy access to friendly critical areas.
- Identify and recommend actions to counter enemy intelligence collection capabilities.
- Implement the following controls to support force projection:
- Establish access to national HUMINT and CI databases, automated links to joint service, coalition, and HN sources to help identify, assess, and develop countermeasures for threats. Develop FLASH precedence reporting procedures.

- Receive and disseminate CI information and specific CI tasks from ASAS and other means such as the CHATS.
- Support further CONPLAN and OPLAN development. MI units continually monitor and update their CONPLANS to reflect the evolving situation, especially during crises.
- Immediately before deployment, update deploying forces with the most recent intelligence on the AO and update your technical databases and situation graphics.
- Develop contingency tailored packages that allow the G2/S2 to place the right force support teams in a deployable posture with an adequate amount of training.

#### DEPLOYMENT:

Success in force projection operations hinges on the capability of airlift and sealift assets to move forces into the AO. Force protection is more critical during this stage.

- Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W indicators. Continuously conduct and update IEW, CM, and synchronization planning.
- Plan enroute updates to eliminate information voids and allow your commander to adjust OPLANS prior to arrival in theater. Request supporting intelligence organizations use SATCOM, broadcast technology, and ADP systems to provide graphic and textual intelligence updates while enroute.
- Continue IPB.
- Provide timely, accurate, and specific infrastructure and weather information. IMETS can provide weather information.
- Use accurate situation development to help the commander understand and reduce risk on the battlefield.
- Use the DST, collection plan, R&S plan, ISM, and SOR to anticipate which decisions the commander and staff will make.

ENTRY OPERATIONS:

During initial entry operations, EAC organizations provide major intelligence support in a "smart push" mode. This support may include departmental, joint, and scalable Army intelligence elements capable of deploying forward. Entry units must continue to "smart pull" the intelligence they need for operations.

- Continue to conduct force protection planning.
- Monitor the buildup of the in-theater capability required to conduct sustained IEW operations and to reduce your total dependence on split-based, "top driven" intelligence from outside the AO. As organic IEW assets flow into the theater, assess their reliability for tactical intelligence. (National and theater organizations will still remain sources of strategic intelligence.) Determine intelligence crossover point.
- Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W indicators.
  - Routinely debrief troops.
  - Use local nationals employed by or in frequent contact with your force to provide information (area experts must analyze it).
- Ensure liaison personnel and basic communications are in place prior to the scheduled arrival of parent commands.
  - Deploy HUMINT forces into theater as early as possible.
  - Contact HN or civil authority. (Contact CA units; see FM 41-10.)
  - Contact other services.
  - Contact lateral units.
  - Coordinate with supporting CI unit for CI support to force protection.
- Emplace ACT, DISE, NIST, and other elements.
  - Establish security.
  - Establish communications.

- Establish analytical capability.
- Perform IPB.
- Continue to conduct CM and intelligence synchronization planning. Recommend revised PIR and IR. Refine, manage, and update SOR. Evaluate reporting.
- Consider space requirements, power, and logistical support for high use or unique items.
- Conduct situation development, target development, and support to targeting. During this stage as combat strength increases, your unit's organic tactical systems will conduct situation and target development (intelligence crossover point).
- Develop measurable criteria to evaluate the results of your collection plan. Reassesses—
  - "Push" versus "pull" requirements.
  - Communications architecture.
  - Reporting procedures and timelines.
  - Crossover point in intelligence.
  - Intelligence support to OPLANs and OPORDs, branches, and sequels (to include planning follow-on forces).

#### WAR TERMINATION AND POSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS:

Upon cessation of hostilities or truce, deployed forces transition to a period of postconflict operations.

Commanders redirect PIR and IR to support units conducting restoration operations (e.g., engineer units conducting infrastructure reconstruction operations, medical and logistics units providing humanitarian relief). The nature of the PIR shifts from assessing threat forces to assessing political, economic, social, religious, and other conditions that affect force protection and the desired end-state; planning residual presence of US forces; and preparing for redeployment of forces.

## FM 34-8-2

- Continue to conduct force protection planning.
- Remain open to the possibility that hostilities could resume.
- Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W indicators.
- Continue to conduct CM and intelligence synchronization planning. Update collection planning.
- Refine, manage, and update SOR.
- Evaluate reporting.
- Disseminate intelligence.
- Use pre-deployment tactical tailoring procedures to plan a phased redeployment of IEW assets and personnel ensuring continual coverage of the commander's requirements.

### REDEPLOYMENT AND RECONSTITUTION:

As the combat power and resources decrease in the AO, force protection and I&W become the focus of the CCIR. This drives the selection of those MI units that must remain deployed and those which may redeploy.

- Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W indicators.
- Continue to conduct force protection planning.
- Request intelligence BOS support (theater and national systems) and provide intelligence in support of redeployment and reconstitution (reverse intelligence crossover point).

### DEMOBILIZATION:

Demobilization is the process by which MI individuals and units transfer from active to a premobilization or other approved posture. MI units resume intelligence readiness posture. RC MI units transition to peacetime status.

- Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W indicators.
- Capture consolidated databases.

- Capture lessons learned via AARs (doctrine and TTP).
- Maintain intelligence readiness (e.g., training).
- Adjust MTOEs and evaluate the need for IMAs.



## Chapter 3

## MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (MDMP)

<p><b>MDMP in General</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ FM 101-5 is the doctrinal source.</li> <li>■ The MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical technique.</li> <li>■ The commander must follow the one-third/two-thirds planning rule.</li> <li>■ MDMP helps the commander and staff examine a battlefield situation and reach logical decisions.</li> <li>■ The commander can decide to use the complete or abbreviated version.</li> <li>■ Staffs should train on both the complete and abbreviated versions.</li> <li>■ Incomplete execution of the MDMP is a recurring deficiency at the CTCs.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Intelligence in the MDMP</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ MDMP is based on continuous IPB, especially initial IPB during mission analysis.</li> <li>■ The commander drives intelligence; IPB is an integrated staff function driven by the commander.</li> <li>■ Train your section to conduct IPB so you can coordinate closely with other staff and BOS representatives.</li> <li>■ You must understand how all the BOS operate and how to integrate intelligence during planning, especially within the targeting process IAW FM 6-20-10.</li> <li>■ "Push" the staff to develop a robust and integrated R&amp;S plan.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Staff Estimates</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ FM 101-5 provides a generic staff estimate.</li> <li>■ The generic staff estimate is the base for the commander's operations, personnel, intelligence, logistics, CMO, communications, and special staff estimates.</li> <li>■ These staff estimates are designed to form, analyze, compare, and recommend friendly COAs.</li> <li>■ Staff estimates are continuous, must not be overly time consuming, and do not have to be a written product (time dependent).</li> <li>■ The wargame results and staff estimates help the staff compare COAs.</li> </ul>	<p><b>The Intelligence Estimate</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The purpose, scope, and content of the intelligence estimate changed with draft of FM 101-5.</li> <li>■ The old intelligence estimate was a text-based product derived from IPB that focused on ECOAs, capabilities, strengths, and vulnerabilities.</li> <li>■ This old intelligence estimate is functionally replaced by IPB products.</li> <li>■ A standard staff estimate prepared by the G2/S2 is the new intelligence estimate—it is radically different.</li> <li>■ The new intelligence estimate focuses on the G2/S2's ability to support friendly COAs and is used to compare and approve friendly COAs.</li> </ul>

<p>Step 1: Receipt of Mission</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The mission comes from higher headquarters or is derived from an ongoing mission.</li> <li>■ On receipt of a new mission, the G3/S3 issues a WARNO to the staff.</li> <li>■ The staff immediately prepares for mission analysis (SOP preparation).</li> <li>■ Immediately the commander and staff do a quick initial assessment with emphasis on an initial allocation of available time.</li> <li>■ The commander issues his initial guidance, and the G3/S3 issues a WARNO to subordinate units.</li> </ul>	<p>Intelligence in Step 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Collaborate with your higher G2/S2 before and during receipt of mission to facilitate the initial IPB.</li> <li>■ As part of the initial assessment, look for gaps in your intelligence database and products.</li> <li>■ Proactively request/prepare terrain products, weather, light, and climatology data; update the MCOO and doctrinal templates; maintain the enemy situation.</li> <li>■ Focus on the initial time allocation (complete or full MDMP), R&amp;S guidance, and any additional tasks or focus from the commander's initial guidance.</li> <li>■ Establish/verify an IHL.</li> </ul>
<p>Step 2: Mission Analysis</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Analyze the higher HQ order. (If confused by or you disagree with it, seek immediate clarification or resolution.)</li> <li>2. Conduct initial IPB.</li> <li>3. Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks. (It is important to understand specific requirements for each task.)</li> <li>4. Determine the AI.</li> <li>5. Review available assets. (The staff must identify additional resources needed to ensure the mission's success.)</li> <li>6. Determine constraints (normally found in the scheme of maneuver, concept of the operation, and coordinating instructions).</li> <li>7. Identify critical facts and assumptions. (List all appropriate assumptions from higher; state relevant conditions over which the commander has no control.)</li> <li>8. Conduct risk assessment.</li> <li>9. Determine initial CCIR. (Limit to 10 or less.)</li> </ol>	<p>Intelligence in Step 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Intelligence and intelligence-related products:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>  AI.</li> <li>  Initial PIR (from the commander.)</li> <li>  Initial OPSEC vulnerabilities and EEFI.*</li> <li>  MCOO and terrain as described by OCOKA and its effects.</li> <li>  Assumptions (include enemy mission, objectives, threat BOS activities).</li> <li>  Other elements of the battlefield.</li> <li>  Situation templates (unrefined).</li> <li>  Event templates and matrices (unrefined).</li> <li>  Center/centers of gravity.</li> <li>  HVTs.</li> <li>  The IPB portion of the mission analysis brief and associated graphics (OB, weaknesses and peculiarities, activities and capabilities, and COAs).</li> <li>  Collection plan (initial, G2 only).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10. Determine the initial reconnaissance plan. (The resulting R&amp;S annex sets reconnaissance in motion.)</li> <li>11. Plan use of available time. (The commander and staff refine initial plan for use of available time.)</li> <li>12. Write the restated mission. Who, what, when, where, and why.</li> <li>13. Conduct mission analysis briefing. (Given to commander and staff. The briefing is critical to ensure a thorough understanding of planning.)</li> <li>14. Approve the restated mission.</li> <li>15. Develop the initial commander's intent. A clear, concise statement of what the force must do regarding the enemy, terrain, and desired end-state.</li> <li>16. Issue the commander's guidance. This provides additional guidance to focus staff planning.</li> <li>17. Issue a WARNO.</li> <li>18. Review facts and assumptions. When facts or assumptions change, the commander and staff must assess their impact.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>  The R&amp;S plan (initial plan that starts R&amp;S operations) and associated FRAGOs or WARNOs.</li> <li>  Intelligence estimate (initial).</li> <li>■ These products are used to write Annex B to the OPORD or OPLAN and as the foundation for the DST* later in the MDMP.</li> <li>■ Based on mission analysis, request information or intelligence based on intelligence gaps.</li> <li>■ Develop as many ECOAs as time will allow.</li> <li>■ Your higher HQ OPORD, OPLAN, and/or Annex B will task your unit to perform certain collection or R&amp;S tasks.</li> <li>■ Start the subsequent steps of CM &amp; intelligence synchronization (FM 34-2) to support the initial collection plan (at a minimum SII, SIR, and SOR).</li> <li>■ The R&amp;S plan is a coordinated staff effort that must include FS, MEDEVAC, and CONPLANs (e.g., what the brigade does if 2 key scout sections are destroyed).</li> <li>■ The MI Bn/DS MI Co participates in mission analysis and briefs the collection status and capabilities.</li> </ul>
<p>Step 3: COA Development</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Analyze relative combat power. See FM 34-130 for estimating relative-force ratios.</li> <li>2. Generate options. Goal is to develop COAs for every feasible ECOA; however, the commander usually limits that option with his guidance.</li> <li>3. Array initial forces. Identify number of units needed and operational methods; develop a knowledge base to help make decisions.</li> <li>4. Develop the scheme of maneuver.</li> <li>5. Assign headquarters. This creates the task organization.</li> </ol>	<p>Intelligence in Step 3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Intelligence and intelligence-related products: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>  Situation templates (refined and prioritized).</li> <li>  Event templates and matrices (refined).</li> <li>  EWTL (initial).*</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ Ensure the G3/S3 uses the IPB facts, assumptions, and products developed during mission analysis and subsequently refined.</li> <li>■ Work with the entire staff to ensure that friendly COAs take advantage of the environment and threat situation.*</li> </ul>

<p>6. Prepare COA statements and sketches.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The G3/S3 uses appropriate media to clearly portray how unit will accomplish the mission (e.g., scheme of maneuver).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Key on threat vulnerabilities.</li> <li>■ Your input is critical in analyzing relative combat power.</li> <li>■ Do not forget to support deception planning (when appropriate).</li> </ul>
<p>Step 4: COA Analysis (Wargame)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Gather the tools.</li> <li>2. List all friendly forces.</li> <li>3. List known assumptions.</li> <li>4. List known critical events and DPs; include an HVTL list.</li> <li>5. Determine evaluation criteria.</li> <li>6. Select the wargame method.</li> <li>7. Select a method to record and display results.</li> <li>8. Wargame the battle and assess results.</li> </ol> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The wargame is a critical and disciplined process used to visualize the flow of battle.</li> <li>■ The commander selects the order of comparison of threat to friendly COAs.</li> <li>■ The staff must evaluate the need for branches and sequels.</li> <li>■ When technically possible, the staff should capture as much of the wargame on ATCCS as possible; otherwise, use a wargame worksheet or ISM.</li> <li>■ These wargame results are key to developing DSTs and BOS synch matrix.</li> <li>■ Use the action, reaction, counteraction method (consider at a minimum maneuver, FS, mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, and IEW).</li> <li>■ The staff should track force ratios throughout the wargame.</li> </ul>	<p>Intelligence in Step 4</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Intelligence and intelligence-related products:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>  PIR with LTIOV (refined).</li> <li>  HPTs.</li> <li>  Confirmation of the enemy center/ centers of gravity.</li> <li>  Situation templates (final).</li> <li>  Some force protection issues (e.g., NBC vulnerabilities).</li> <li>  EWTL (refined).*</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ You wear both a "red" and "blue" hat in wargaming.</li> <li>■ As the enemy commander you project enemy actions or reactions, develop DPs, and project enemy losses.</li> <li>■ During the wargame you must address all relevant enemy BOS capabilities.</li> <li>■ As the friendly G2/S2, you identify IR and NAIs; refine the situation template; and participate in the targeting conference.</li> <li>■ Ensure the G3/S3 honestly portrays friendly capabilities during the wargame.*</li> <li>■ Work with entire staff to ensure friendly COAs take advantage of environment and threat situation.</li> <li>■ Ensure HPTs, AGMs, and TSS support the operation.*</li> <li>■ The AGM is approved by the commander and addresses which targets will be attacked, how, when, and the desired effects.</li> <li>■ TSS are criteria used in deciding whether to pass information as a target nomination.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The MI Bn/DS MI Co commander and collection manager are important players at the wargame.</li> </ul>
<p>Step 5: COA Comparison</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Used to identify COA that has highest probability of success.</li> <li>■ Staff may use any technique; the decision matrix is the most common.</li> <li>■ Staff gets its criteria from the commander (e.g., the principles of war or tenets of Army operations).</li> </ul>	<p>Intelligence in Step 5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Intelligence product:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>  Intelligence estimate (final).</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ Ensure you play a key role during this step.</li> </ul>
<p>Step 6: COA Approval</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ If the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff a new COA, staff must wargame that COA.</li> </ul>	<p>Intelligence in Step 6</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Intelligence and intelligence-related products:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>  PIR with LTIOV (approved).</li> <li>  DST (an integrated staff product).</li> <li>  BOS synch matrix.*</li> <li>  ISM.</li> <li>  Event templates and matrices (final).</li> <li>  The R&amp;S plan (final).*</li> <li>  Collection plan (refined, G2 only).</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ Start the subsequent steps of CM and intelligence synchronization (FM 34-2) (i.e., development of new SII, SIR, and SOR).</li> <li>■ If the commander designates you to perform BDA to support one of his decisions, you must thoroughly plan the BDA support and tie that plan into the collection plan.</li> </ul>
<p>Step 7: Orders Production</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Based on the commander's decision and final guidance.</li> </ul>	<p>Intelligence in Step 7</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Intelligence and intelligence-related products:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>  OPORD or OPLAN Annexes B (Intelligence), L (R&amp;S), P (C<sup>2</sup>W)*, Q (OPSEC)*, S (Deception)*, and T (EW).*</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p>* The G2 participates in developing the products but is not the proponent.</p>	

### ACCELERATING THE MDMP:

The MDMP involves three techniques that can be applied in different situations: deliberate, abbreviated, and accelerated. Only the accelerated technique is discussed herein because it is the most difficult to implement. (See CALL Newsletter Update No. 95-12.)


The accelerated technique may be used when one or more of the following conditions apply:

- Commander has a staff available to assist him in developing the plan, but little time to use a more formal process.
- Commander does not have a staff, or the staff is not accessible.

When these conditions apply, the commander must rely primarily on TLP to develop his plan. The accelerated technique assists the commander in developing a tentative plan. Under extreme circumstances, this may be little more than a mental process; nonetheless, the commander can use it to assist him and key staff members (S2/S3/FSO/XO) as he develops his plan.

The accelerated technique follows the basic procedures in the deliberate and abbreviated processes, but the differences are more significant. The major differences between the abbreviated and accelerated techniques involve the commander's guidance and the COA development phase (Figure 3-1). The accelerated technique is characterized by active participation by the commander, and development of one COA that is suitable, feasible, and flexible.

In some situations, the products developed using the accelerated technique may be the same as those developed when using the deliberate or abbreviated technique. Because time is the key factor, the accelerated technique will normally result in the development of a FRAGO.



**Figure 3-1. Accelerated MDMP.**

#### MISSION ANALYSIS:

*ISSUE:* The commander and staff must be able to rapidly conduct the mission analysis to determine the restated mission.

*DISCUSSION:* When using the deliberate or abbreviated technique, the staff conducts a detailed mission analysis to develop the restated mission. As previously stated, resorting to a mental process in lieu of a detailed restated mission is acceptable; however, this should be the exception rather than the norm. The staff may be forced to brief their initial estimates orally, without the use of charts or viewgraphs. Conduct as formal a mission analysis as time allows. During the mission analysis, there are no major differences between the three techniques. There are no techniques that will significantly reduce the amount of time required to conduct the mission analysis. Anticipation, prior preparation, and experience by the staff are the keys to a timely mission analysis process.

#### TECHNIQUES:

## FM 34-8-2

- Commander must get personally involved by supervising and managing the mission analysis process.
- In extreme situations, the staff must be prepared to brief the commander without the use of visual aids.

### COA DEVELOPMENT:

*ISSUE:* When time is severely limited, providing the commander's guidance after the mission analysis may not be the most appropriate time.

*DISCUSSION:* Instead, the commander may decide to immediately begin personally developing *one* COA with input from selected staff officers. There is probably not time to seek input from every staff officer, so the commander must determine relevant and critical staff officers (e.g., S2, F3, FSO, XO). This team may vary depending on the type of mission. For example:

- In the defense include staff engineer.
- During SASO include CA, PAO, SJA, PSYOP.
- In other situations, include subordinate commanders because of their experience.

This team must then quickly develop a flexible COA to accomplish the mission. The key to success, when using the accelerated technique, is to rapidly develop a base plan with appropriate branches that is flexible, feasible, suitable, and acceptable. ***DO NOT WORRY ABOUT DEVELOPING THE PERFECT COA; THERE IS NOT TIME FOR IT.*** This is the major distinction between the accelerated technique and the others.

Once the COA is developed, the commander might consider conducting a hasty wargame. In extreme situations, this may be the only opportunity to conduct the wargame process. Next, the commander should begin to quickly develop his guidance to the staff. The accelerated technique is

characterized by an active role of the commander, and very specific guidance to the staff.

### *TECHNIQUES:*



- Focus on developing one COA with branch plans that is flexible, feasible, suitable, and acceptable.
- The commander plays the central role when developing this COA.

#### COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE:

Once the commander has developed the COA, he must issue guidance to his staff so it can refine and wargame the COA. The commander's guidance to the staff must be directive and specific. The staff's responsibility is to support the commander's plan, not to develop the perfect plan. Well-developed and clearly communicated commander's guidance can be a significant timesaver. The commander's guidance should serve to keep the staff focused by establishing parameters to work within. Commander's guidance must be constantly reviewed and analyzed. As the situation changes and information becomes available, the commander may have to alter his guidance to the staff.

#### COA ANALYSIS:

*ISSUE.* The commander and staff must rapidly conduct the COA analysis process.

*DISCUSSION:* Conducting the wargame process using the accelerated technique is the most difficult of the three processes because only one COA was developed. The purpose of the COA analysis is not to analyze and compare multiple COAs that result in a recommendation to the commander, but to synchronize and integrate the commander's directed COA. This wargame session should focus on refining the branches or contingencies to the base plan and follow the formal wargame process as much as time allows. Focus on the most critical events. You do not have time to wargame the entire operation. When wargaming using the accelerated technique, the commander's involvement is even more important. The staff should use the box technique, focusing on actions at the objective or the engagement area. If time permits, wargame other critical events as well. The staff must work to support the commander's plan. However, as the staff works to refine the plan, it cannot become so biased that it develops a plan that is infeasible and insupportable. If the staff determines that it cannot support the commander's plan, then a new COA must be developed.

*TECHNIQUES:*

- If time permits, conduct a hasty wargame session during the COA development step. Ensure you identify and develop branches to the base plan.
- Involve the commander. He must supervise the wargame session, actively participate, make decisions, and provide guidance as required.
- Use the box technique, focusing on the most critical event first.

DECISION:

When using the accelerated technique, a decision brief is not required because only one COA was developed. The only decision that may be required is if the developed COA becomes unsuitable, infeasible, or unacceptable. If this occurs, another COA must be developed.

ADVANTAGES:

- Requires less time.
- Facilitates adaptation to a rapidly changing situation.
- Allows commander to compensate for lack of a staff or an experienced staff.

DISADVANTAGES:

- Significantly limits staff initiative and flexibility.
- Very directive, explores only one friendly COA.
- May result in only an oral order or FRAGO.

## CHAPTER 4

### S2 OPERATIONS CHECKLISTS

Intelligence operations will usually begin with a notice tasking statement. CONPLANS, training, the N-Hour sequence, and the MDMP contribute to mission readiness. The S2 can use the following checklists to monitor intelligence readiness prior to receipt of a mission and subsequently to verify preparations and facilitate mission planning.

The timelines used could apply to any echelon.

- Mission Checklist (Table 4-1).
- N-Hour Critical Times (Table 4-2).
- N-Hour Critical Actions List (Table 4-3).
- Mission Planning Sequence (Table 4-4).
- Reconnaissance Planning (Table 4-5).

Table 4-1. Mission checklist .

Mission Day Minus	ACTION	REMARKS
A-28	Notify attachments to provide updated access rosters prior to A-Day.	
	Provide open access to national and strategic databases.	
	Initiate verification of clearances within battalion.	Include sensitive positions and RTOs.
	Coordinate security briefings for unit personnel.	Include all OPSEC program components and SAEDA program.
	Coordinate contingency AI briefings.	
	Verify access to intelligence databases through division or higher.	Disseminate hard copy products to subordinate units.
	Inspect unit areas and equipment for physical security deficiencies.	Coordinate for support and access. Check equipment compatibility.
	Review section files.	Designate deployable and nondeployable records.
	Obtain current TECHINT/User Bulletins and DIA Top Ten Equipment Acquisition list from 203d MI Bn (TECHINT).	Acquire information on disposition directives from JCS and theater commander.
A-21	Obtain higher HQ access roster.	Update as required throughout mission cycle.
	Coordinate security force requirements with tasked units and MP.	
	Identify linguists in unit or update current file.	Provide list, crosscheck with S1 data.
	Provide updated list of telephone numbers to be cut off at N+2 to the S1.	
A-14	Finalize security plans and instructions.	Check guard/MP patrols.
A-8	Coordinate security requirements for filler personnel.	Barrier material, lighting, container seals, security of vehicle holding area, motor pool, empty barracks.

Table 4-1. Mission checklist (continued).

Mission Day Minus	ACTION	REMARKS
A-8	Prepare DA Form 3964 for classified material transported with deploying elements.	
A-7	Brief MI battalion LNO on duties.	Ensure copy placed in SDO book.
A-4	Finalize MI battalion personnel and equipment support list.	
A-4	Update section alert notification roster.	
A-4	Continually monitor intelligence WATCHCON levels.	
A-4	Check alert rosters in SDO book and completion of all unit OPSEC and SAEDA briefings.	
A-Day	Brief RDC on battalion security plan.	EEFI material, handle accordingly.
A-Day	Issue guard instructions.	
A-Day	Provide access rosters to rear detachment personnel, higher and supported HQ.	

Table 4-2. N-Hour critical times.

N-Hour	EVENT	REMARKS
N-Hour	Notify and assemble units. Initiate telephone control. Initiate area security plan. List questions for N+2 brief.	
N+1:30	Prepare staff equipment to go to staging area. Verify basic load, load plans.	Maps, batteries, etc.
N+1:45	Depart for N+2 brief location. Distribute updated access roster. Secure battalion conference room.	
N+2:00	Present N+2 briefing. Coordinate with CI to initiate OPSEC plan; inspect battalion area for physical security violations.	
N+3:30	Present the intelligence estimate.	
N+3:45	Confirm transfer of company arms room keys to the rear detachment S2 before departing to staging area. Verify security clearances of attachments through supporting S2.	
N+4:30	Sweep battalion area with CI personnel.	
N+5:00	Impose restrictions on incoming/outgoing mail.	When given proper authority.
N+6:30	Issue OPOD at staging area.	
N+8:00	Ensure rear detachment is briefed on security. Provide latest intelligence update to commander and staff. Have LNOs, DS MI CDR attend.	
NOTE: Modify times depending on mission requirements and SOPs.		

Table 4-3. N-Hour critical actions list.

H-HOUR	ACTION	ACTION OFFICER(S)
1	Mission Receipt	
1	WARNO-----	CDR, S2/S3
-	Do IPB-----	S2 (w/asst from ENGR, Terrain, Weather, etc)
2	Mission Analysis	
2	Brief Mission to CDR-----	Coordinating Staff
-	Initial CDR's Guidance	
2	Do COAs-----	CDR, S2/S3
3	Staff IPB & COAs-----	S2, S3
4	Do Staff Estimates-----	Unit Staff
-	COA Analysis (wargaming)-----	CDRs, Unit Staff
5	Select Best COA-----	S3, Selected Staff
6	Do DST-----	S2/S3, FSO, ADA, ENGR, SIG, CHEM
5	Brief DST	
7	Brief Selected COA-----	Selected Staff
-	CDR's Decision	
7	WARNO Scouts/Patrols Recon-----	S2/Asst S2/BICC officer/S3
8	Mission Brief	
8	OPORD Prep/Staff Coord-----	Unit Staff
8	Turn in OPOD Annex	
9	Proof OPOD	
10	Issue Targeting Overlay-----	FSO
11	Brief Scouts/Patrols Recon-----	S2/Asst S2/BICC officer/S3/ENGR/FSO/ADA
12	Execution Matrix-----	S3
13	BOS Synchronization Matrix-----	Unit Staff
14	Maps/Charts Prep-----	Unit Staff
14	CDR's Map Updated-----	S2/S3
15	OPORD Rehearsal-----	XO, S3
16	OPORD Briefing-----	XO
17	Initial Backbrief	
17	TF CDR Brief Higher HQ-----	CDR, S2, S3
17	Co/Bn CDR Backbrief	
18	Rehearsal-----	Unit Staff, CDR
19	Final INTEL Update-----	S2
	LD/LC	

NOTE: These items are not listed in a definite order; some may not occur at all.

Table 4-4. Mission planning sequence .

## S2 ACTIONS UPON RECEIPT OF A MISSION:

1. Receive and analyze mission:
  - Receive CDR's guidance and assist in development of CDR's PIR.
  - Understand CDR's intent.
2. Define the battlefield environment:
  - Identify AO and AI.
  - Identify battlefield characteristics that will influence friendly and threat operations.
  - Identify intelligence gaps.
  - Develop preliminary IR.
  - Identify specified and implied intelligence tasks:
    - Specified: From OPORD Annex B, R&S Appendix, tasks to subordinate units, MI task organization for combat, coordinating instructions, and collection plan.
    - Implied: Mission dependent METT-T.
      - M—Mission (CDR's intent, PIR, scheme of maneuver).
      - E—Enemy (OB and IPB to develop collection IR).
      - T—Troops (Organic and Higher Assets).
      - T—Terrain and Weather (R&S asset LOS, LOCs, obstacles, weather effects on system's collection ability).
      - T—Time Available (Plan, Move, Operate, Report).
  - Determine availability of organic/attached/supporting intelligence assets.
3. Request support/information from higher HQ if items/information are not available organically:
  - Maps/Imagery/sketches/blueprints of objectives, NAIs.
  - Collection plan, asset available times and asset tracks.
  - Weather - light data and climatic summary.
  - Enemy OB data.
  - Terrain products (LOC/vegetation/CCM/MCOO/elevation/LOS/hydrology).
  - Higher R&S plan.
  - Determine R&S assets you and higher HQ will control (intelligence architecture).
  - Determine availability, coordinate intelligence support from non-MI systems and organizations (AN/TPQ-36/37, OH-58D, FISTV, AN/TPS-25A, AN/TPS-58B, Engr, Co/teams, Cavalry, chemical units).
  - Obtain SOI; sign and countersign information through unit SIGO.
  - Advise higher of your recommended PIR and expected intelligence gaps.
4. Distribute maps, imagery, and sketches (maintain accountability).
5. Brief staff on abbreviated intelligence estimate to assist their mission planning.
6. Issue WARNO to R&S assets.
7. Describe the battlefield's effects:
  - Analyze terrain.
  - OCOKA factors.
  - Effect on friendly and enemy operations.
  - Analyze weather effects on terrain, troops, equipment, and friendly and enemy operations.



Table 4-4. Mission planning sequence (continued).

8. Assess other characteristics of the battlefield (mission dependent):
  - Politics.
  - Population.
  - Demographics.
  - Social ethnic/Religion.
  - Economic
9. Evaluate threat:
  - Evaluate enemy OB, current disposition and strength, committed and reinforcing units (maneuver, artillery, engineer, ADA, NBC, UW, air, intelligence assets, smoke, E-O sensors) and current significant activities.
  - Evaluate threat capabilities and tactics.
  - Develop/refine intelligence database and threat models.
  - Prepare doctrinal templates.
  - Prepare threat critical event lists.
10. Determine ECOAs:
  - Use doctrinal templates to develop event and situation templates (include all forces that can affect mission completion), AAs and MCs.
  - Identify enemy mission and intent.
  - Determine (in simple terms) how the enemy sees us acting in this operation.
  - Determine how the enemy is currently disposed and what must be accomplished to get from now to his desired end state, given that this ECOA must account for our actions determined in 3 above.
  - Determine enemy concept of the operation and subunit tasks. How will each of the following contribute to accomplishing the intent determined in 2 above:
    - Maneuver.
    - RISTA.
    - FS.
      - \* Artillery/mortars/rockets.
      - \* CAS.
      - \* Aviation.
      - \* NBC weapons.
      - \* EA.
    - Air defense - Recommend task organization for MI assets.
  - Identify most likely and most dangerous ECOAs.
  - Identify IR and NAIs for each friendly COA identified; TAIs with S3/FSO for each COA.
  - Develop HPTs for each friendly COA with S3/FSO.
  - Assist in developing HVTs for each ECOA.
  - Integrate EA into targeting.
  - Determine BDA criteria (damage required for each target, a means to determine damage).
  - Finalize and prioritize PIR (obtain CDR's approval).
  - Define indicators and SIR.
  - Send WARNO on threat to subordinate units to facilitate planning.
11. Develop ISM:
  - Tie to PIR/IR (include LTIOV).
  - Include timeline, required decisions, decision criteria, SIR, collection assets.
  - Plan for system cross-cue, back-up coverage.
  - Ensure it answers CDR's requirements for intelligence, targeting, and BDA in time to make decisions.

Table 4-4. Mission planning sequence (continued) .

- Participate in staff wargame of DST and targeting plan (as opposing CDR).
- Never hold MI assets in reserve.

12. Develop R&S plan and overlay to support DST (with support from S3/FSO/ENGR/ ADO) (see Reconnaissance Planning below):

- Determine indicators, SIR, NAls, DPs, TAls.
- Ensure NAI/TAl support synchronization of R&S plan with fire plan and scheme of maneuver.
- Identify intelligence gaps and request collection support from higher (RII).
- Develop communications plan/reporting schedule.
- Wargame R&S and collection plan.
- Update ISM, R&S, and/or collection plan.
- Receive, consolidate, and deconflict subordinate R&S plans and overlays.
- Consider "Reconnaissance Fundamentals" [Maximum reconnaissance force forward, orient on the location or movement of the reconnaissance objective, report all information rapidly and accurately, retain freedom to maneuver, gain and maintain enemy contact, develop the situation rapidly (FM 17-95).]
- Consider "R&S Principles" [(1) Tell the commanders what they need to know in time for them to act and (2) Do as much as possible ahead of time (FM 34-2-1)].

#### RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING

While the DMP for reconnaissance operations is conducted in the same manner as for any other combat operation, the following steps will assist the reconnaissance planner in ensuring that the unique features of reconnaissance operations are addressed.

##### Reconnaissance Mission Analysis

- **Identify Reconnaissance Objectives.** Reconnaissance mission analysis must identify the objectives of the unit's reconnaissance effort. These objectives are obtained from—
  - PIR.
  - DPs.
  - HPTs/HVTs.
  - Confirming Events. (These are enemy actions and counteractions that confirm an ECOA and are determined by event analysis.)

The reconnaissance planner may determine that some of the above requirements may be accomplished by RFIs to higher HQ, but all of those that are not must become reconnaissance objectives.

- **Identify Reconnaissance AO.** Reconnaissance planners identify the area in which reconnaissance forces will be operating, either specified by control measures such as LOAs or CFLs or implied by the location of reconnaissance objectives.
- **Restate Reconnaissance Missions.** Once reconnaissance objectives have been determined, the mission for each element of the unit reconnaissance force must be determined from task analysis and stated as a subunit task. The task analysis process—determining specified, implied, and essential reconnaissance tasks and identifying limitations and constraints—is described in FM 101-5. Reconnaissance missions will be determined to be reconnaissance-in-force or zone, area, route, or force-oriented reconnaissance missions.
- **Identify Available Reconnaissance Force.** Reconnaissance planners must identify the subunits that are available to execute the unit's reconnaissance effort and their current and projected status.

Table 4-4. Mission planning sequence (continued) .

■ **Identify Available Equipment.** Reconnaissance planners must identify the equipment available in an FMC status that will be used by elements of the reconnaissance force to accomplish reconnaissance tasks.

#### RCOA Development

■ **Identify Required Reconnaissance Force.** Reconnaissance planners must identify the force required to accomplish the unit's reconnaissance objectives. The number and type of elements involved will be based on the following:

- Number, type, location, and sequencing of reconnaissance objectives. Some objectives will require constant surveillance. Some will be time-phased and need only be observed for part of the battle. Some elements of the reconnaissance force will be able to accomplish several reconnaissance objectives.

- Type of reconnaissance mission. A route reconnaissance will require a different element than a reconnaissance-in-force.

- Strength, composition, and disposition of enemy security force. For each element of the reconnaissance force, the decision will have to be made whether it will have to infiltrate or penetrate the enemy security force. Infiltrations dictate stealthy elements and techniques while penetrations will require the correct reconnaissance force ratio.

■ **Identify Required Equipment.** Each reconnaissance objective will require specific reconnaissance equipment based on the following:

- Proximity of the reconnaissance element to the objective. What is the effective observation range?
- Environmental conditions. What will be the impact of severe weather? Night?
- Signature provided by the target. Does it emit a signal? Heat? Does it need to talk to anyone?

■ **Determine the Reconnaissance Scheme.** The RCOA must ensure that all reconnaissance objectives are addressed by elements of the reconnaissance force that can provide the read on the objective required by the commander. The reconnaissance force must therefore be in the right place, at the right time, and with the right observation, communications, and force protection equipment. The RCOA must deploy the reconnaissance force in depth to ensure that contact is not lost with moving reconnaissance targets. It must identify reconnaissance objectives that cannot be addressed so that RFI's may be prepared or risk accepted. In developing the RCOA, reconnaissance planners must answer the following questions:

- Are all PIR, HPT, DP, and confirming events addressed as reconnaissance objectives or RFI?
- What role will other BOS/combat operations play in the reconnaissance scheme?

- FS (to include EA and SEAD for air insertions/extractions).
- Air defense.
- Mobility/counter-mobility.
- CSS.
- Deception.
- OPSEC.

- How will this RCOA—

- Maintain focus on the reconnaissance effort?
- Gain and maintain contact with reconnaissance targets?
- Provide early warning?

- How will we ensure that reconnaissance operations remain the bde/TF initial main effort?

Table 4-4. Mission planning sequence (continued) .

- What is the reconnaissance force's relationship with security force?
- How far forward will we conduct reconnaissance? Is there a force in front of us? What are the control measures?
- How will fire support be integrated into this RCOA?

■ **Determine Task Organization, C<sup>2</sup> Relationships.** Once the reconnaissance force and its associated equipment are determined, it must be task organized to accomplish the RCOA in the most efficient manner. The C<sup>2</sup> structure must address unity of effort by identifying the COR. The COR must have the control structure and authority to direct the reconnaissance force. Reconnaissance operations often take place over large distances and long periods of time where communications systems are subject to attack. The communications plan will require careful attention to the use of retransmitted teams and redundant systems.

■ **Identify Control Measures.** While reconnaissance operations require the same positive control measures as any other, some require special attention.

- LOA. This measure identifies the forward edge of the reconnaissance battlespace and is usually associated with a CFL or FSCL.
- BHL. Reconnaissance forces operate throughout the unit's AO, but must be able to coordinate the acceptance of reconnaissance targets entering their battlespace with the unit to their front.
- TF Forward Boundary. In brigade operations there will often be a need to identify a brigade zone forward of the subordinate maneuver TFs.

■ **Determine CSS Requirements:**

- Resupply: How often, by whom, where, how?
- CasEvac: By whom, how?
- Reconstitution: From where will reconstituted reconnaissance forces come? What are the priorities?

#### RCOA Analysis and Wargaming

■ **Key Events to Wargame During Analysis of an RCOA:**

- Infiltration or penetration of the enemy security force.
- Insertion/extraction methods.
- Backup communications plan.
- CasEvac operations.
- Change in reconnaissance objectives based on new information.
- Handover of reconnaissance target leaving reconnaissance unit's LOS or AO.

#### R&S Ten Keys To Success

1. Commander's intent and CCIR drive R&S.
2. Support R&S early with integrated staff products.
3. Be adept at abbreviated IPB for Quick or Combat Decision Making Process.
4. S2 focus on the event template to capture the moving enemy.
5. S2 then provides situation template, depicting enemy in the engagement area.
6. Use automation tools like ASAS to enhance products.
7. Deploy organic R&S assets early and request support from higher. Issue S3 FRAGO with S2 graphic overlay.
8. Provide continuous coverage throughout the depth of the battlefield.
9. Use all possible assets from national level to scouts.
10. Evaluate reporting and provide immediate and continuous feedback to the commander.